We propose that an active takeover market also provides incentives by o¤er-ing acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows …rms to reduce perfomance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute to board dismissal for the replacement of poorly performing managers. The joint impact of the two mechanisms on managerial turnover is, however, multi-faceted: In …rms with strong boards, turnover and performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In …rms with weak boards, turnover (performance-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing the quality of its board, each …rm does not take into account the e¤ect on other …rms' acquisition opportunities. As a result, there is excessive board interference in equilibrium and too few takeovers occur. JEL Classi…cation: G34, J33, J63.
Introduction
An active takeover market is commonly considered to create value by redeploying corporate assets. A plethora of empirical studies documents that target shareholders as well as target and acquiring shareholders taken together bene…t from takeovers (Andrade et al., 2001) . Moreover, an active market for corporate control also a¤ects managerial behavior. In particular, the threat of a takeover is seen to discipline incumbent managers, thereby reducing agency costs (Jensen, 1986, and Scharfstein, 1988) . 1 This paper takes a new look at the incentive implications of takeovers. While extant work emphasizes the risk of being a target, we want to draw attention to the ‡ip side, namely the prospect of acquiring another …rm. We therefore posit that the market for corporate control shapes managerial incentives through two channels, the takeover threat and the acquisition opportunity. Taking both these sides into account, we derive the optimal quality of internal governance in a single-…rm setting. We also analyze how …rms'governance choices and takeover activity interact in equilibrium.
More speci…cally, we consider a simple two-period moral hazard model in which a …rm hires a manager whose ability is unknown to all parties. First-period performance is a function of both managerial e¤ort and ability. Second-period performance only depends on ability, and dismissing an incompetent manager increases expected secondperiod pro…ts. A manager who is deemed competent retains his job for the second period and may in addition have the possibility to acquire another …rm. Managers are induced to exert e¤ort explicitly through performance-based compensation and implicitly through future private bene…ts. As managers enjoy more private bene…ts from running larger …rms, acquisition opportunities provide (additional) incentives. This in turn mitigates moral hazard and the need to o¤er performance-based compensation. Thus, the market for corporate control can bene…t shareholders even in the absence of disciplinary takeovers, i.e., even if incompetent managers are never retained.
This insight has implications for …rms'acquisition policies. When shareholders, or the board of directors on their behalf, decide on the acquisition budget, they face a trade-o¤: on the one hand, more funds enable the manager to undertake also a (more) unprofitable takeover. On the other hand, a larger budget increases the chance of making an acquisition and therefore provides more incentives. Due to the latter e¤ect, the optimal acquisition budget never permits only pro…table acquisitions but always allows for some unpro…table takeovers as well.
2 Our model predicts an inverse relationship between (managerial discretion over) the acquisition budget and (performance-based) CEO pay, 1 Though the literature also points out potential ine¢ ciencies of the takeover threat. For instance, Stein (1988) and Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that takeover pressure can lead to distorted investment decisions.
2 Contrary to the literature on empire building, acquisitions are here a remedy rather than a source of incentive problems. However, our model assumes that shareholders have the control over the acquisition budget. This precludes takeovers against the shareholders'best interest in equilibrium. and worse acquisition performances for …rms with larger budgets. 3 For the sake of clarity, we derive the acquisition opportunity e¤ect in a simpli…ed setting in which disciplinary takeovers play no role as incompetent managers are always dismissed by the board. To explore the interaction between board quality and the takeover market, we extend the framework in two ways: First, we let the …rm choose the quality of its internal governance, modeled as the probability that an incompetent manager is dismissed by the board. Second, a …rm can be a potential acquirer or target, depending on its …rst-period performance. Board interference and (hostile) takeovers are both means to dismiss incompetent managers and jointly determine managerial turnover. Since board interference is costly to the …rm, more intense takeover pressure crowds out internal governance. Better prospects of selling the …rm reduce the cost of retaining an incompetent manager and hence the bene…ts of good internal governance.
While takeovers and boards are substitutes with respect to disciplining managers as in e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998) , their combined impact on managerial turnover and performance-based compensation is more complex. In particular, more takeover pressure can exacerbate the agency problem and necessitate more performance-based pay. When board interference is not very costly, the quality of internal governance is high, and introducing a small takeover probability entails a strong crowding out e¤ect. As a result, an incompetent manager is less likely to retain his job in the absence of disciplinary takeovers compared to being exposed to a small takeover risk. 4 When the takeover risk is su¢ ciently large, increases in the takeover probability always lead to higher managerial turnover. Thus, we obtain a non-monotonic relation between takeover threat and managerial turnover when internal governance is intrinsically strong. This in turn translates into a non-monotonic relation between takeover threat and performancebased compensation, as compensation is inversely related to managerial turnover. By contrast, when internal governance is costly and hence weak, more takeover pressure always increases the overall dismissal risk. Therefore, the relation between takeover threat and managerial turnover (performance-based pay) is always positive (negative) in this case.
In the last part of the paper we show how governance externalities can arise through interactions in the takeover market. To this end, we consider a large number of ex-ante identical …rms whose role in the takeover market depends on their …rst-period cash ‡ows. Poorly performing …rms become potential targets and well performing …rms are potential acquirers. In equilibrium …rms choose too much board interference (quality) but too small acquisition budgets. On the one hand, each …rm fails to internalize that improvements in its board reduce the acquisition opportunities for other …rms. On the other hand, each …rm does not take into account that a larger budget would strengthen the takeover threat to other …rms and discipline their managers.
Our paper is related to theoretical work on takeovers, boards of directors and governance spillovers. While takeovers are but a threat to incumbent managers in existing takeover models, we argue that they are also opportunities which o¤er implicit incentives. In Almazan and Suarez (2003) a weak board is optimal when incentive provision through future control rents is cheaper than through incentive pay. In our model a weak board exacerbates the agency con ‡ict within the …rm but creates an acquisition opportunity, thereby mitigating agency problems in other …rms. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998) also analyze the joint functioning of board dismissals and takeovers. In their model, the acquirer can replace the manager and in addition dismiss the board. Due to this latter possibility, the takeover market and board interference are complements when the costs of removing the board are low. When these costs are suf…ciently large, internal and external control mechanisms are substitutes as in our model where the position of the board is never under threat. Our paper further di¤ers from theirs by exploring the dual role of the takeover market and the joint impact of board dismissal and takeovers on managerial turnover and performance-based compensation.
Finally, several recent papers study the interaction between …rms'choices of corporate governance. Acharya and Volpin (2009) identify an externality that operates through the competition for scarce managerial talent. To incentivize managers, …rms with weaker governance o¤er more generous compensation packages. To remain attractive employers, other …rms also have to pay high(er) salaries, which reduces the bene…ts of investing in corporate governance. As a result, the overall governance in the economy is too weak. Dicks (2008) also derives a governance externality operating through executive compensation and explores its regulatory implications. Cheng (2008) explores governance spillovers in a setting where relative performance evaluation provides incentives for managers to manipulate earnings. Our model di¤ers form these as the governance externality operates through the takeover market rather than the managerial labour market or CEO compensation.
The next section presents the basic model. Section 3 develops the acquisition opportunity e¤ect. Section 4 analyzes the interactions between takeovers and board interference and their implications for CEO turnover and compensation. Section 5 studies the link between the …rms'governance arrangements and the takeover market outcome. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. All mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
We consider a moral hazard problem with two periods of production. A …rm hires a manager who is either competent or incompetent. As in Holmström (1982) or Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , the manager's type 2 ( ; ) is initially unknown even to him. All parties hold the common prior p 2 (0; 1) that the manager is competent ( = ). Everyone is risk-neutral and there is no discounting.
Once hired, the manager chooses a non-observable e¤ort e 2 fe l ; e h g. He enjoys private bene…ts Z 1 if he exerts low e¤ort (e = e l ). At the end of the …rst period, the cash ‡ow X 1 2 f0; X by the above assumption. It states that the expected pro…t that a competent manager creates in an acquired …rm is at least equal to the value created by a new manager. Throughout the paper we assume that the board takes the decisions on behalf of the shareholders and does so in their best interest. At the hiring stage, the board o¤ers the manager a contract, comprising a compensation scheme and an acquisition rule. The compensation scheme stipulates payments to the manager contingent on the …rm's cash ‡ow. Since the manager takes no actions in the second period, there is no role for secondperiod wage payments. Let (w H ; w L ) denote the payments in case of …rst-period success and failure respectively neither of which can be negative. The acquisition rule amounts to an acquisition budget over which the manager has complete discretion when undertaking a takeover. The budget is contingent on …rst-period performance. Let (L H ; L L ) be the non-negative budgets in case of …rst-period success and failure, respectively. The manager can only carry out a takeover if the budget covers the total acquisition cost c + P a .
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To sum up, the timing of the game is as follows: (i) The parties sign a contract (w H ; w L ; L H ; L L ) and the manager chooses an unobservable e¤ort level e 2 fe l ; e h g. (ii) First-period cash ‡ow X 1 2 f0; X H 1 g realizes and is publicly observed. (iii) The board decides to retain or dismiss the manager. (iv) If retained, the manager …nds a potential takeover target with probability a , in which case (c; P a ) is publicly observed. (v) A takeover may or may not occur and second-period cash ‡ow realizes. Finally, we want to ensure that shareholders always …nd it optimal to induce high e¤ort.
High e¤ort is surely in the shareholders'interest if the disutility of e¤ort is smaller than its expected bene…ts. A high e¤ort is not only a prerequisite for a high cash ‡ow in the …rst period but may also allow to infer the manager's ability (whereas nothing is learned if the manager exerts low e¤ort). Hence, high e¤ort increases the expected payo¤ in the second-period by (1 p)X H 2 . The assumption is stricter than necessary as it abstracts from the manager's future private bene…ts and the potential gains from an acquisition.
The above framework captures in a simple manner the notion of corporate governance as a mechanism that "selects the most able managers and makes them accountable to investors" (Tirole, 2001) . Following …rst-period performance, shareholders update their beliefs about the manager's ability. If they suspect him to be unsuitable a new manager can be hired. Indeed, Cornelli et al. (2010) …nd that boards …re CEOs once they have come to view them as incompetent. In our setting, the level of competence refers to general managerial skills. If a manager proved his competence in one …rm, he can also successfully manage a rival following a takeover. This feature is consistent with Kaplan et al. (2008) who study hiring decisions in LBO and venture capital …rms and …nd that these decisions are driven by general or transferable managerial skills.
We do not explicitly model the labor market in which …rms can compete for a competent manager at the interim date. However, the private bene…t Z 2 can be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining game between a competent manager and shareholders whereby the former obtains part of the surplus that he generates compared to a random outside replacement.
Acquisitions and CEO Incentives
This section analyzes the optimal compensation scheme and acquisition policy taking the probability of …nding a potential target and the purchase price as given. To start with, suppose that the incentive compatibility constraint of the manager is satis…ed. Given that the manager exerts high e¤ort, the …rst-period cash ‡ow perfectly reveals his ability. Hence, the posterior belief that the manager is competent p(X 1 ) equals zero following poor performance and one following a high performance.
The …ring decision after the …rst period in ‡uences …rm value in two ways. It determines the ability of the manager in the second period and thus X 2 (ex-post e¤ect). In addition, it a¤ects the manager's incentive to exert e¤ort because he receives private bene…ts if retained (ex-ante e¤ect). It is straightforward to see that the optimal …ring policy is to dismiss the manager unless X 1 = X H 1 . An incompetent manager never produces positive pro…ts in the second period (X a 2 = X 2 = 0), whereas hiring a new manager generates expected cash ‡ow of pX H 2 . Furthermore, it is also optimal to punish poor performance from an ex-ante perspective. Given that poor performance triggers dismissal, the choice of the corresponding budget L L is immaterial and is subsequently ignored. The only caveat against retaining a successful manager is the risk that he subsequently incurs excessive losses in an acquisition. Indeed, a manager always favours an acquisition because of the additional private bene…ts Z 2 . However, (very) poor acquisitions can be avoided through a tight(er) acquisition budget.
A retained manager is competent and …nds with probability a a target. Provided that the acquisition budget exceeds the total cost, i.e., that L H c + P a , he purchases the target and gets additional private bene…ts Z 2 . The expected second-period pro…t from retaining a successful manager with an acquisition budget L H is
where the integral corresponds to the expected net pro…t from a takeover.
Having established the outcome for competent and incompetent managers, we can derive the contract o¤ered at the outset of the game. By Assumption 3 shareholders …nd it optimal to induce high e¤ort. As it is never bene…cial to reward poor performance, the wage in case of a low …rst-period cash ‡ow w L is set to zero. Given the acquisition budget following poor performance is immaterial, the shareholders'expected payo¤ simpli…es to
With probability p the manager turns out to be competent and produces a …rst-period pro…t of X H 1 net of his wage plus 2 (L H ) in the second-period. With probability (1 p) the manager is incompetent, and the expected second-period cash ‡ow under the newly hired manager is pX H 2 . The manager's incentive compatibility constraint is:
If the manager works and turns out to be competent he receives expected private bene…ts Z 2 + a F (L H P a )4Z 2 in addition to his (non-negative) wage w H . Recall that the manager does not know his own type when choosing his e¤ort. Rearranging the IC constraint we …nd
Future private bene…ts serve as an implicit incentive to exert e¤ort. In particular, the takeover market relaxes the IC constraint by o¤ering additional private bene…ts with probability a F (L H P a ). The positive e¤ect on incentives arises because …rst-period success is a prerequisite for making an acquisition. Since the objective function is decreasing in w H , the incentive compatibility constraint determines the optimal wage unless the constraint w H 0 binds. If the implicit incentives as measured by
are su¢ ciently large, the optimal wage is zero. In the following, we focus on the case where the IC constraint binds.
Given that monetary incentives are necessary to ensure e¤ort provision, the following result holds:
and the optimal acquisition budget for a successful manager is
The wage is increasing in the private bene…ts from shirking and decreasing in the private bene…ts from running the …rm in the second period. The optimal acquisition budget equals the sum of shareholders'gross return and the manager's private bene…ts from an acquisition. The above argument and the subsequent analysis assume that the manager is risk-neutral and his reservation utility is to equal zero. Together with the assumption of a positive wage this allows us to ignore the participation constraint of the manager. A more general setting would allow for risk aversion and an outside option, which may lead to a binding participation constraint. In this case, the optimal compensation scheme would include a …xed payment in addition to the performance-based reward. While we continue to assume that the participation constraint is slack, we henceforth interpret the wage w H as the performance-based component of the compensation scheme rather than the overall level.
Proposition 1
The market for corporate control provides managerial incentives even in the absence of disciplinary takeovers.
The common view of takeovers emphasizes the bene…ts from the "contestability" of the managerial position. For instance, Jensen (1988) argues that (the prospects of) disciplinary takeovers reduce agency con ‡icts and improve performance. In the above setting there is no scope for an external disciplinary mechanism since an incompetent or failed manager is always dismissed by the board. Still, the market for corporate control bene…ts shareholders by reducing agency costs through acquisition opportunities. Compensation is decreasing in the acquisition probability a F ( e L H P a ) and in the private bene…ts from running a larger …rm 4Z 2 . Note that the acquisition opportunity e¤ect also arises in more general settings with risk-aversion and outside options as it relaxes both the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint. When assessing the empirical magnitude of this e¤ect, one needs to take into account that the acquisition opportunity e¤ect, just like the well-established threat e¤ect, also arises for non-transacting …rms.
Proposition 2 The optimal acquisition budget also allows for some loss-making acquisitions.
From the shareholders'perspective, the ex-post optimal budget equals X H 2 and only allows for pro…table acquisitions. Due to the acquisition opportunity e¤ect, it is, however, in the shareholders'interest that the manager can undertake also some loss-making acquisitions ( e L H > X H 2 ). That is, the optimal budget policy trades o¤ the cost of a loss-making acquisition with the bene…t of lower incentive pay. Since both e¤ects are proportional to the acquisition probability a , e L H does not depend on the acquisition probability. By taking future control bene…ts into account, the model provides a novel rationale for loss-making acquisitions.
6 Rather than being a symptom of weak corporate governance, acquisition losses are an integral part of the optimal incentive scheme. Once e¤ort has been exerted, shareholders would never voluntarily provide funds in excess of X H 2 for an acquisition. Hence, the optimal acquisition budget has to be …xed in the initial contract. While the board or the shareholders must be able to commit to e L H , the above solution is renegotiation-proof in the sense that the manager cannot be bribed into accepting a lower acquisition budget ex-post. The joint surplus of the manager and (acquiring) shareholders is maximized by e L H since a takeover occurs if and only if X H 2 + 4Z 2 P a c. Hence, there is no scope to renegotiate. The optimal budget policy can be implemented in many di¤erent ways. If the intermediate income is low (X H 1 < e L H ), implementation requires additional funds beyond those generated internally. For example, at the hiring stage the …rm can obtain a nonrevokable credit line, amounting to e L H X H 1 , in combination with a commitment to leave the intermediate income in the …rm. Instead of using a credit line, the board can ex-ante endow the manager with cash reserves or other liquid assets of the same amount. Conversely, if the intermediate income is larger than the optimal budget ( e L H < X H 1 ), funds need to be pumped out of the …rm to prevent the manager from incurring excessive acquisition losses. For instance, short-term debt of X H 1 e L H can reduce the resources under the manager's control.
Lemma 1 has several further implications. Shareholders'expected acquisition losses are
increasing in e L H . Hence, the model predicts that …rms with more …nancial slack experience higher acquisition losses in expectation. At the same time, the performance-based component of compensation, e w H , should be lower if a manager has more …nancial resources under his control. Hence, performance-based compensation and expected future acquisition losses move in opposite directions: an increase in 4Z 2 raises l while lower-ing e w H . Interpreting w H as a measure of pay-for-performance sensitivity, this result is consistent with Yang et al. (2008) . They …nd that banks whose CEOs have higher payfor-performance sensitivity are less likely to undertake value-reducing acquisitions. To the extent that more performance-based compensation is also associated with a higher level of compensation, our model is consistent with Falato (2007) who documents a negative relationship between the level of compensation and acquisition losses.
The career concern literature argues that future private bene…ts are positively correlated with the manager's career horizon (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) . They are likely to be lower for a manager who is close to retirement.
7 According to this interpretation, our model suggests that a younger manager, for whom Z 2 and 4Z 2 are large, should be endowed with a larger budget. Since the acquisition probability is increasing in e L H , he should thus be more likely to undertake acquisitions. Yim (2010) documents that a …rm's acquisition propensity is indeed decreasing in the age of the CEO. (Though she does not …nd that younger managers enjoy greater …nancial slack.) The sensitivity of compensation to the acquisition budget ( e w H = e L H ) should be larger for younger managers. The literature has identi…ed two means by which an active takeover market can enhance e¢ ciency, the reallocation of corporate resources (ex-post) and the disciplinary role of the takeover threat (ex-ante). We uncover a third channel that may arise independently from these two. The takeover market reduces agency con ‡icts by providing growth opportunities for successful managers. Discretion over the acquisition decision is part of the optimal incentive scheme and shareholders allow some loss-making acquisitions. In this section we extend the model in two ways to allow for the possibility of both internal governance failure and disciplinary takeovers. First, we let the …rm choose the quality of its board. Second, the …rm can now be an acquirer or a target in the takeover market, depending on its …rst-period performance. Hence, a poorly performing manager can be dismissed either by the board or through a disciplinary takeover. 9 We model internal governance as choosing the probability that the board is able or not to dismiss the manager. Let s 2 fg; bg denote the state or quality of internal governance and 2 [0; 1] the probability that the …rm is well governed (s = g) in which case the board can replace the manager at the interim date. With probability (1 ) internal governance breaks down (s = b) in which case board dismissal never occurs. The state s 7 Lemma 1 suggests that explicit incentives should, ceteris paribus, be lower for managers early on in their career which is consistent with Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . 8 The idea that managerial autonomy comes not only with costs but also with bene…ts has been previously pointed out (Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Burkart et al., 1997) .
9 Jensen (1993, p. 863) notes that "the available evidence does suggest that CEOs are removed after poor performance, but the e¤ect [...] seems too late and too small to meet the obligations of the board". realizes and becomes observable at the end of the …rst period. Before hiring the manager, shareholders choose the probability at a cost K( ) = 1 2 k 2 with k > 0. To ensure an interior solution for the probability that the …rm is well governed we impose a lower bound on the interference cost parameter:
The cost K( ) can be interpreted literally as the resources spent on evaluating managerial performance (for instance by installing a transparent accounting system). Alternatively, K( ) can be understood as a measure of the con ‡ict of interest between the board and shareholders. The failure to dismiss a poorly performing manager may be due to board members'lack of independence, excessive workload, or simply the desire to avoid con ‡icts. A positive interference cost captures in a reduced form the notion that compensation and other incentive schemes cannot fully resolve the con ‡ict of interest.
A …rm with a failed manager can now be taken over. Following poor …rst-period performance, an acquirer shows up with probability t and o¤ers to purchase the …rm for a price P t .
10 For now we assume that this price is exogenous and larger than the (expected) value of the target under a newly hired manager. Since P t pX H 2 target shareholders always accept the o¤er. If the target manager has not already been replaced by the board he loses his position in the takeover.
11 A …rm can be a target also when the board has previously dismissed the manager. By contrast, we rule out that a …rm with a high …rst-period cash ‡ow can be acquired.
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The outcome of the game remains the same following high …rst-period cash ‡ow. The manager is retained and with probability a F (L H P a ) he makes an acquisition at the exogenous price P a . Following poor …rst-period performance, the …rm is taken over with probability t at a price P t . In the absence of a takeover, the manager retains his job if internal governance fails. When a poorly performing manager escapes dismissal, he should be prevented from making an acquisition. Hence, L L is no longer indeterminate but has to be set equal to zero.
As it remains optimal to never reward failure (w L = 0), the maximization problem of the extended game is:
The previous model is the special case with ‡awless internal governance (k = 0 and = 1) and no takeover threat ( t = 0). 11 Increased managerial turnover in target …rms after the takeover has been documented by several studies (e.g., Kini et al., 2004; Martin and McConnell, 1991; Morck et al., 1989) . 12 We exclude this possibility as we want to focus on the incentive e¤ects of takeovers. Arguably, mergers among successful …rms are likely to be (more) incentive-neutral. Such mergers would indeed not a¤ect incentives in our model if each manager is equally likely to become CEO of the combined …rm, implying a gain of Z 2 , as to be demoted to divisional manager, implying a loss of Z 2 private bene…ts. subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
and the constraints
The manager may now receive the private bene…t Z 2 despite poor performance when both internal and external control mechanisms fail (which happens with probability (1 )(1 t )). Rearranging the incentive compatibility constraint yields:
The …rm has three means at its disposal to incentivize the manager. It can o¤er a monetary reward for good performance and provide funds for future acquisitions. In addition, it chooses the quality of internal governance which translates into a dismissal threat following poor performance.
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Lemma 2 The optimal wage is
the optimal acquisition budget is
and the optimal board quality is
As before, the performance-based compensation is decreasing with the implicit incentives embedded in the acquisition opportunities and the dismissal risk. The overall dismissal risk comprises the probability of being dismissed by the board 14 and the takeover threat in case of internal governance failure t (1 ). Thus, the takeover market plays now a dual role, rewarding performing managers with acquisition opportunities and disciplining the others. Though, unless the takeover market operates as a 13 In our framework, board activity corresponds to interference which prevents entrenchment thereby relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint. By contrast, when board activity amounts to learning about managerial quality, it can aggravate agency con ‡icts (Crémer 1995) .
14 Fahlenbrach (2009) …nds that CEO performance-based pay in the US is lower in …rms with higher board quality. ‡awless disciplinary device ( t = 1), an incompetent manager no longer loses his job with certainty. Consequently, the performance-based compensation has to be larger than in Lemma 1. As the modi…cations to the model pertain to the contingency of poor …rst-period performance, the optimal acquisition budget for a competent manager remains unchanged.
Better board quality adds value by replacing incompetent managers in the absence of a takeover and by relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint. The former bene…t is re ‡ected in the second term of equation (3): with probability (1 p)(1 t ) no bidder appears upon poor performance in which case board interference raises expected secondperiod cash ‡ow by pX H 2 . The latter bene…t is the expected pay reduction p(1 t )Z 2 due to the board dismissal threat. Since board intervention is costly, ‡awless internal governance ( = 1) is typically not optimal. Optimal board quality increases with the manager's future private bene…ts Z 2 , as the dismissal threat becomes a more e¤ective means for lowering managerial pay. Higher future cash ‡ow makes board interference more valuable. A stronger board also goes together with a lower cost k.
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We now turn to the e¤ects of disciplinary takeovers on board interference, turnover and performance-based compensation:
Corollary 1 A more active takeover market discourages board interference.
The takeover market weakens the incentive to exert board control for two reasons: the takeover threat relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint and thus obviates the disciplinary role of the board. In addition, the prospect of selling the …rm reduces the ex-post bene…t from internal control. In the limit as t goes to one, internal governance becomes super ‡uous. While board interference and takeovers are substitutes, their joint impact on managerial turnover is multifaceted. Let us de…ne overall turnover risk conditional upon poor …rst-period performance as + (1 ) takeover pressure discourages board interference, thereby indirectly lowering the dismissal threat. When the takeover market is an e¢ cient disciplining device (high t values), the direct e¤ect of an increase in t always dominates, and the overall dismissal threat increases.
This does not necessarily hold for low t values but depends on the optimal board quality.
To distinguish between strong and weak boards we de…ne the threshold level k = 2[pZ 2 + (1 p)pX
Proposition 3 In …rms with strong boards (k k), managerial turnover following poor performance is …rst decreasing and then increasing in the intensity of the takeover threat.
For low interference cost the optimal board quality is high in the absence of a takeover threat. As the board operates in this case at high marginal interference cost, the introduction of a small takeover risk leads the …rm to substantially cut board quality. That is, the indirect e¤ect of an increase in t dominates and a greater takeover threat makes the manager's position not less but more secure. Once the takeover probability is large the reverse holds. An increase in t always goes together with a higher turnover risk.
This also applies to the case of weak boards (k < k). In support of Proposition 3, Huang and Zhao (2009) document that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance increases following the adoption of antitakeover legislation in …rms with strong boards. From the optimal wage in (1) it is clear that performance-based compensation and overall turnover risk move in opposite directions. Hence, if turnover is non-monotonic in takeover pressure, so is compensation:
Corollary 2 In …rms with strong boards (k k), CEOs' performance-based compensation is non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) study the e¤ect of the takeover threat on CEO compensation empirically. They …nd that a greater takeover risk leads to higher compensation and attribute this …nding to risk aversion. 16 Our model suggests an alternative explanation for their …nding. A higher takeover threat can in fact lower overall turnover risk for managers thereby necessitating a higher salary. Hence, it would be of interest to explore to what extent this relationship di¤ers for …rms with strong and weak boards.
Market Outcome and Externality
This section goes beyond the single-…rm partial equilibrium analysis and explores how …rms' governance choices a¤ect the outcome in the takeover market. To this end we consider a continuum of ex-ante identical …rms with unit mass which all play the game of the previous section. That is, …rms simultaneously choose the quality of their board ( ) and then agree with a manager on a performance-based pay and an acquisition budget. Managerial ability is initially unknown, and the probability of hiring a competent manager is p and independent across …rms. After the managers' e¤ort choices, …rst-period cash ‡ows realize, board (non-)interference takes place, and the takeover market opens. Given managers exert e¤ort in equilibrium, …rst-period performance fully reveals their type. Firms with a competent manager can by assumption not be targets, whereas incompetent managers will in equilibrium lack the funds to make an acquisition. Therefore, the proportion of potential acquirers and targets in equilibrium is p and 1 p respectively. Depending on p being larger or smaller than 1=2, each target would in the absence of frictions be approached by an acquirer, or each acquirer would …nd a target. We instead assume that the takeover market is plagued by search frictions such that both a and t are always smaller than one. Besides being plausible, this allows us to work with formal expressions that are invariant to which side of the market is the short one.
17 To this end, we impose the following matching technology. Firms are uniformly distributed along a circle, and each …rm is a potential target or acquirer depending on its …rst-period performance. Following a high …rst-period performance, a …rm can only bid for the neighboring …rm to the right if that …rm is indeed a target. Provided the budget L H is su¢ cient to cover takeover price and takeover cost, the bid succeeds with probability 2 [0; 1] where captures the extent to which the institutional and regulatory environment is conducive to takeovers. The transaction price comprises the outside option of the target 2 f0; pX H 2 g and a takeover premium which is equal to a fraction 2 [0; 1] of the gross takeover surplus
. If the target is poorly governed, the price is P b = X H 2 , whereas the price increases to P g = (X H 2 pX H 2 ) + pX H 2 if the target is well governed. Let t b and t g denote the probabilities that a …rm is taken over following poor performance for a price P b or P g respectively. Let b L H and b be the acquisition budget (following success) and the interference intensity of the representative …rm in the economy. Then a …rm with budget L H faces the following takeover probabilities from an ex-ante perspective in the above setting:
For example, the probability of being taken over following a governance failure simply equals the probability that the neighboring manager to the left turns out to be competent and has su¢ cient funds, pF ( b L H P b ), times the institutional friction . A …rm is more likely to be taken over if it is poorly governed (
) because it demands a lower price. Furthermore, a …rm's probability of being taken over is increasing in the acquisition budget of the representative …rm b L H . Takeover pressure is greater if rival managers are well funded. While the risk of being taken over depends on other …rms'behavior through the budget b L H , the chance of taking somebody else over, a (b ), depends on rival …rms through b . The probability that a successful manager can acquire another …rm, given in (6), is decreasing in b . If the economy-wide level of internal governance increases, a successful manager is more likely to face a well-governed target.
Better internal governance, in turn, raises the potential target's reservation price and thus reduces the probability that a transaction takes place (
In a nutshell, board interference reduces the scope for takeovers. We …rst derive the equilibrium where all …rms act simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The takeover market gives rise to strategic interactions between …rms that operate through the takeover probabilities. In the Appendix we prove the following result:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, the ex-ante identical …rms all choose wage
and the acquisition budget
and the equilibrium interference intensity
where t b , t g and a ( ) are given by equations (5) and (6).
The crucial change compared to Lemma 2 is the endogeneity of the takeover probabilities. As discussed in Section 3, the tradeo¤ which determines the optimal budget is independent of these probabilities. Hence, the equilibrium acquisition budget in (8) coincides with that in (2). In particular, a …rm's budget is independent of the level of board interference in rival companies.
The equilibrium budget determines the respective probabilities of being taken over in (5) which in turn …x the equilibrium intensity of board interference in (9). The expected returns of a target in the takeover market now depend on the strength of its board: the second summand in squared brackets on the RHS in (9), t g (P g pX H 2 ), is the expected takeover premium for a well-governed seller and the last term, The equilibrium level of interference determines the acquisition probability in (6). In equilibrium, the performance based component of compensation in (7) depends on both the budget policy and board control in other …rms. Both variables a¤ect compensation directly through the takeover probabilities. Moreover, the budget policies of peers have an indirect e¤ect as they also alter the optimal level of board interference.
The comparative statics analysis in Section 4 generalizes to the market setting in a straightforward manner. Fewer frictions in the takeover market reduce the equilibrium level of internal governance, i.e., is decreasing in . Thus, Corollary 1 remains valid in a slightly modi…ed form. Also, Proposition 3 continues to hold. In equilibrium, overall turnover risk = + t b (1 ) is non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat as measured by . Furthermore, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 More board interference may strengthen or weaken the need to provide managerial incentives.
Stronger board control can result from a decrease in the interference cost. For example, better legal shareholder protection may reduce k. The ensuing increase in the economy-wide level has two opposing e¤ects on incentives. The dismissal threat increases which strengthens incentives. At the same time, improved board control diminishes acquisition opportunities which forces shareholders to increase performance-based compensation. Overall, the e¤ect on the IC constraint is ambiguous. In contrast, if an exogenous shock increases board control in rival …rms only, a manager's wage should increase.
More frictions in the takeover market (decrease in ) strengthen the board's incentive to intervene. The e¤ect on compensation is ambiguous, though, due to the aforementioned argument.
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What is the socially optimal budget policy and governance arrangement that maximizes joint pro…ts for all …rms? In the Appendix we derive the socially optimal governance arrangement and the socially optimal budget policy and …nd the following result:
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, there is excessive board interference ( o < ) and acquisition budgets are too small (L H <L o H ).
In equilibrium, shareholders fail to internalize the negative impact of their governance e¤ort on the acquisition opportunities of rival …rms which hardens the incentive compatibility constraints for all other managers in the economy. Hence, o < . Thus, pro…ts of the corporate sector would increase if each …rm deviated from the privately optimal governance arrangement and installed a weaker board. Weak boards create a more liquid takeover market by increasing the supply of potential target …rms. However, the liquidity of the takeover market is a public good and the supply of targets is too low in equilibrium. The privately optimal level of funding is lower than the socially optimal one. In equilibrium, each …rm ignores that a higher budget imposes greater takeover pressure on rival managers. Higher budgets relax funding constraints of acquirers and thus create a more liquid takeover market. The takeover threat is ine¢ ciently low in equilibrium.
Both the equilibrium interference intensity and the budget policy deviate from the socially optimal levels. In general, privately optimal choices entail an externality in our model as long as they a¤ect the probability of making an acquisition or of being acquired (or both) of other …rms in the economy. In these cases, privately optimal choices will not lead to a constrained e¢ cient market outcome.
Proposition 5 implies that the incidence of takeovers is too low in equilibrium. The direction of the distortion in the wage is ambiguous. While strict budget policies drive up the wage, excessive board interference may increase or decrease performance-based compensation relative to its socially optimal level (Proposition 4).
Excessive board interference results from spillover e¤ects between …rms. This contrasts with existing theories of overmonitoring. Pagano and Röell (1998) argue that monitoring by a large blockholder can be excessively high because he fails to internalize the negative e¤ect of interference on the manager's rent.
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Our results contrast with other recent papers that study peer group or spillover effects in corporate governance. Archaya and Volpin (2009) uncover an externality in …rms' choices of governance that operates through the managerial labor market rather than the takeover market. 20 In their model poorly governed …rms pay their manager higher compensation. If there is competition for managerial talent, a …rm may be forced to overpay its manager in order to prevent him from accepting a more generous compensation package in a weakly governed rival. While their de…nition of governance (as shareholders' ability to interfere and …re the manager) is very similar to our de…nition of , we obtain opposing empirical predictions. In our framework, the manager's compensation should increase if an exogenous shock improves the e¤ectiveness of boards in rival …rms. A positive shock diminishes acquisition opportunities and thus reduces the manager's incentive to exert e¤ort. Conversely, Archaya and Volpin (2009) argue that a manager's compensation decreases if rival …rms are better governed. Better governed rivals o¤er lower wages which reduces the manager's outside option. Hence, compensation can be reduced. Moreover, while we …nd overprovision of governance in equilibrium, there is underprovision in their model.
Conclusion
Previous research on the incentive implications of takeovers has focused on the threat of being taken over and its e¤ect on management behavior. We argue that the takeover market mitigates agency con ‡icts by providing acquisition opportunities for successful managers. As a consequence, takeovers may bene…t shareholders even if they neither play any disciplinary role vis-a-vis target …rms nor create any value directly (e.g. through the installation of a new management team). At the same time, takeover pressure sti ‡es the board's incentive to discipline management, possibly to the extent that it aggravates agency con ‡icts in target …rms. In …rms with strong boards, a higher risk of being taken over may secure management's position in the …rm. Finally, a liquid takeover market with a su¢ cient supply of potential targets and acquirers constitutes a public good that provides implicit incentives to all managers in the economy. In equilibrium, an externality in governance choices across …rms arises. Board interference, which reduces the scope for value-enhancing acquisitions, is excessive and acquisition budgets are too small. As a consequence takeover activity is ine¢ ciently low. The binding incentive compatibility constraint yields w H in (7). The FOC with respect to yields (9). The …rst-order condition with respect to L H is
Proof that @ =@ < 0.
To prove that the above expression is negative is su¢ ces to show that the term in squared brackets on the RHS is negative. Substituting the takeover probabilities and prices into h to yields:
The …rst order condition with respect to b L H yields:
From the …rst order conditions it is immediately apparent that b
